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Abstract 
 
It is the aim of the present paper to analyse how inter-organizational performance of open 
innovation projects is affected by governance. It is emphasized that under different combinations 
of environmental and behavioural uncertainty, the combination of structural and relational 
governance mechanisms lead to highest inter-organizational performance. Four types of 
innovation networks, established on the basis of a literature study, are analysed on the basis of in-
depth case-studies. Data are collected through semi-structured interviews in 18 sustainability-
oriented open innovation projects in the agri-food industry. It is concluded that a medium to high 
level of formalization has a positive relationship with inter-organizational performance, 
irrespective of innovation uncertainty and network heterogeneity. Competence trust and outcome-
related inter-organizational performance, and compliance trust and inter-organizational 
performance in terms of the quality of the cooperation process show positive relationships. 
Compliance trust, on the basis of previous cooperation, is the highest in networks with low 
innovation uncertainty and low network heterogeneity.    
Key Words: Inter-firm collaboration, formal and relational governance, agri-food industry 
 
Introduction 
 
Sustained firm performance is dependent on continuous change and improvement. An 
important solution to the challenges which the Dutch agri-food sector faces is innovation. New 
products and exploitation of new markets, in combination with sustainability-oriented practices 
throughout the chain, can strengthen the competitive position of the Dutch agri-food companies. 
Such radical innovations bring along uncertainties and challenges. Inherent to innovation is 
uncertainty about the tasks to be undertaken to achieve the innovation goals, uncertainty about 
the outcomes and uncertainty about market potential of the innovations. Uncertainty complicates 
governance of innovation networks because reduces the number of possible agreements which 
can be made at the start of the project. This reduced possibility for ex ante planning, compels 
partners to ex post negotiation which creates space for conflict and misunderstandings. For 
companies that invest a lot of time, effort and resources in innovation projects, it is essential to 
manage the uncertainties involved to increase the chance of profit generation from innovation 
investments. 
 
Consumer trends, such as the increased attention to health issues and sustainable ways of 
food production demand innovative food and production processes (Dijkman, ABN Amro, 2009. 
If agri-food companies ought to exploit the first-mover advantage of sustainability-oriented 
chains, they need to adopt an integral approach, cooperate with their chain partners and assure 
top-down (governmental) and bottom-up (customers/consumer organisations) support. Therefore, 
inclusion of different stakeholders in the innovation processes is considered important for success. 
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The open innovation platform offers possibilities to include these partners, create new ideas and 
embark on different resources and knowledge (Marinova and Philimore, 2003). While access to 
and use of the knowledge and skills from customers, suppliers, competitors, universities and 
other organisations through open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) offers opportunities, it brings 
along additional challenges to the innovation process. For example, differences among partners in 
terms of differing interests, capacities and views may bring about difficulties with regards to 
appropriation of innovation, prioritisation of project activities and agreements compliance issues.  
 
In order to find out how governance affects performance, we need to take into account the 
open innovation circumstances in which the partners operate. The combination of environmental 
and behavioural uncertainty sets the stage in open innovation networks. In this paper, four types 
of innovation networks, created on the basis of a combination of environmental and behavioural 
uncertainty, are analysed. The questions is how governance mechanisms can be employed to deal 
with the challenges created by the combination of these conditions, in a successful way. It is 
argued that the combination of structural (formal agreements and administrative rules and 
organisation) and relational (trust and commitment) governance mechanisms improves 
coordination and performance of innovation networks. While previous research has touched upon 
the combination of informal and formal governance mechanisms (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), it  
predominantly took place in the field of medium to high-tech sectors. This study aims to explore 
whether these previous findings apply to a low to medium technology field, such as agriculture.  
 
In the second Section, innovation uncertainty and network heterogeneity, and the challenges 
which emanate from these two features of innovation networks are described. Subsequently, the 
theoretical perspectives which yield insight into governance of these challenges are addressed, 
followed by exploration of governance mechanisms required in four types of networks to deal 
with different combinations of innovation uncertainty and network heterogeneity. The third 
Section elaborates on the study population and data collection methods. In the fourth Section, 
comparison between the successful and less successful projects, within the four types of networks, 
is done to allocate effective governance (Dyer and Singh, 1998) mechanisms for the four types of 
innovation networks. The process-oriented, case-study approach to the analysis gives the 
opportunity to compile in-depth information about the developments within the collaboration 
during the entire project. In the fifth Section, results from the literature study and results from the 
empirical part of the research are jointly discussed.  
 
2.1 Innovation uncertainty  
Innovation is a process of creative destruction, where the quest for profits pushes to innovate 
constantly, by breaking old rules to establish new ones (Schumpeter, 1934). It is a process of 
interrelated sub-processes, such as conception of a new idea, invention of a new device, and 
development of a new market (Myers and Marquis, 1969). Innovation processes are usually 
organised in the form of projects. As not all project go through the same stages of the innovation 
process, differences in the level of uncertainty exist among different projects. For example, 
innovations in an early stage of development usually cope with greater unresolved demand, 
technological and resource uncertainties. Uncertainty is determined by the extent of (in)ability to 
determine what to pursue, how to pursue and whether the pursuit is likely to be profitable 
(Sapienza and Gupta, 1994). One of the most important dimensions of uncertainty, in settings of 
innovation, is of environmental nature (Williamson, 1989) and is concerned with market 
uncertainty or demand uncertainty (Burgers et al., 1993). While firms are able to react to demand 
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uncertainties, they are not able to eliminate it because customer preferences are unstable or 
changing continuously (Beckman et al., 2004). The primary consequence of environmental 
uncertainty is an adaptation problem, meaning difficulties with modifying agreements to 
changing or unforeseen circumstances (Rindfleisch et al., 1997, p.31).  
 
2.2 Network heterogeneity  
Open innovation assumes that firms can and should use external as well as internal ideas and 
paths to the market, as they look to innovate (Chesbrough, 2007). Innovation in this open system 
often takes place in the context of a network, which is a collection of nodes and ties representing 
some relationship, or lack of relationship, between the nodes (Burt, 2005). In this study, the focus 
is on innovation networks which are distinguishable due to their specific nature characterized by 
conversion of information from diverse sources into useful knowledge about designing, making 
and selling new products and processes (Küppers and Pyka, 2002, p.3). Despite the major 
advantages of open innovation, inter-organisational cooperation adds complexity to innovation 
processes. Especially in heterogeneous circumstances, it is difficult to establish a priori whether 
partners will behave in an opportunistic or a self-interest seeking way. The lower density of ties  
decreases the possibility for observation of behaviour directly and increases asymmetry in 
information exchange. It generates difficulties with regards to verifying whether compliance with 
established agreements has occurred. Even if the operations or actions can be measured, the 
information gathering and processing costs may be too high. The different backgrounds and 
interests of actors, as well as the differences in their capabilities and knowledge complicate the 
cooperation process and increase coordination costs. Omta and Van Rossum (1999) introduce the 
„dark side of cooperation‟ which emphasises fear of leakage of skills, experiences and 
competencies that form the basis of the competitiveness of a firm, leakage of information and 
insights about possible new markets and future possibilities, hidden administering costs of setting 
up and monitoring of a collaboration, creation of a rival or creation of dependency on a key 
partner, as potential challenges to governance. Next to the monitoring difficulties, behavioural 
uncertainty complicates governance also by constituting difficulties in safeguarding specialised 
knowledge or information against leakage or opportunistic misuse. When any kind of specificity 
in the assets or resources is employed in an exchange, the chance for opportunistic behaviour or 
misuse increases. In addition, as new knowledge and information is created during the 
cooperation, appropriation of knowledge or conversion to property rights becomes an additional 
challenge to governance. Accordingly, it needs to be studied how to cope with the downside of 
cooperation.  
 
2.3  Governance perspectives  
The structural perspective is grounded in transaction cost (Williamson, 1985) and contract 
theory, with the assumption is that rational behaviour governs exchanges. Rational behaviour 
may entail opportunistic or self-interested behaviour, however it can be managed by 
formalisation or  interference in collaborative endeavours” (Vlaar et al., 2007; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002). The main difference between the structural and the relational perspective lies in the basic 
assumption whereupon the two streams of theories are based. While the arguments and 
propositions of transaction cost theory start with the assumption of self-interested behaviour of 
the human being, the relational view bases its arguments on the assumption of a „social‟ human 
being, who is able to trust and who can be trusted. The criticism on the structural, contract-
cantered perspective is that it focuses on the economic aspects of exchange and neglects the 
social context within which the relationship is embedded. Combining the structural and relational 
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perspective offers the opportunity to dismiss this critique and optimalise governance. For 
example, rational commitment (Cullen and Johnson, 2000), which is based on calculated self-
interest or gain and constitutes a structural incentive, can be complemented by attitudinal 
commitment. From the relational point of view, attitudinal commitment, or the value of 
relationship as an asset which yields high returns, generates the incentive to participate and abide 
to the agreements made. Secondly, control through the means of law, structure and planning, 
which stems from the structural perspective, can be strengthened through the presence of trust, 
and vice versa.  As Vlaar et al. (2007) concluded, “when there is an initial experience of high 
level of trust in inter-organisational relationships, establishment of higher level of formal 
coordination and control may be regarded as symbols of shared values and articulation of 
communal norms and customs. Formalisation in this case is regarded as a signal of commitment” 
(Vlaar, et. al., 2007, p. 420). Thirdly, while the structural perspective allows for the necessary 
adaptation through the means of arbitration, internal dispute settlement, and changes in the 
planning made at the start of cooperation, the relational view complements this by emphasising 
that due to the value attached to the relations, partners adapt to one another‟s needs and are 
willing to accept temporary periods of inequity (Madhok, 1995). Because the mechanisms from 
both perspectives entail different strengths, formal or structural and informal or relational 
mechanisms are integrated in this study (see table 1). 
 
Table 1  Distinguishing attributes of theoretical perspectives on governance 
 
2.4 Governing innovation uncertainty and network heterogeneity  
Relationships between organization in a network are maintained either informally, through 
norms of reciprocity and trust, or formally, through existence of contracts, rules, and regulations 
(Provan et. al., 2007, p.503). Also Grandori (1997) indicates that effective governance systems 
can be obtained by combining formal and informal governance mechanisms. Vlaar et. al. (2007) 
argue that when there is an initial experience of high level of trust in inter-organizational 
relationships, establishment of higher level of formal coordination and control may be regarded 
as symbols of sharing values and articulation of communal norms and customs. Formalization in 
this case is regarded as a signal of commitment (Vlaar, et. al., 2007, p. 420). Consequently, it is 
argued in this paper that formal and informal governance can strengthen each other.  
The transaction cost perspective posits that structural arrangements are key to the 
organizational design needed to manage uncertainty (Williamson 1989). As Jones et al. (1997) 
argue, when customized, complex tasks are the subject of cooperation, the desirable and 
necessary continuity, the need for safeguarding and coordinating exchanges, as well as adaptive 
capabilities inhibits parties from using market mechanisms. In addition, weaker appropriability 
makes coordination and administrative control less costly than emphasis on market mechanisms 
or neoclassical contracting. The structural perspective offers the possibility for a certain extent of 
administrative control. The network of partners is able to design dispute settlement machinery, 
employ central planning, etc. in order to refrain from setting up detailed and complex contracts ex 
ante and resort to judicial procedures, in case dispute resolution is needed. The mechanisms 
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proposed by the relational view are expected to strengthen the adaptation capacities of 
governance in settings of innovation. The value of relationships is that shared expectations and 
trust induce desirable behaviour and reduce the need for monitoring (Ouchi, 1980). When 
expectations are shared and partners trust each other to a great extent, there is a sense of 
obligation to fulfil one‟s obligations and promises, not to free-ride, cheat or mislead the partners. 
The partners are able to trust each other that there will be no disclosure of partners‟ specialized 
information or knowledge to third parties. This reduces the level of behavioural uncertainty. In 
addition to trust, the information sharing and reputational effects help to deal with the monitoring 
difficulties created by the heterogeneity of autonomous parties taking part in the inter-
organisational innovation projects. The information sharing, increasing knowledge about one 
another, augments the value of the relationships which on its part enhances the propensity to 
adapt to one another, creates trust and entices a common interest and shared expectations. The 
latter facilitate tolerance of both, partial goal conflict and temporary periods of inequity in the 
relationship. Due to the reduction of friction, efficiency is attained (Madhok, 1995).  
 
As Jones et al. (1997) argue, it is not a single condition, but a combination of conditions, 
which propel particular governance mechanisms. In the empirical part of research, the effect of 
the combination of the two conditions of inter-organisational innovation settings, innovation 
uncertainty and network heterogeneity, will be explored. For this purpose, four types of 
innovation networks are distinguished (see table  2). In addition, Table 2 gives a systematic 
overview of the governance mechanisms which are expected in the different types of network.  
 
  Table 2 Types of networks and expected governance mechanisms 
 
2.5  Inter-organizational performance  
In order to determine which governance mechanisms are more successful in different types of 
networks, we look at inter-organizational performance of innovation projects which take place in 
networks of actors. Collaboration in the setting of innovation is related to two aspects, content 
and process. On the one hand, the collaboration aims at a number of objectives, and on the other 
hand, a number of indirect, process-related aspects play a role in the collaboration. Because 
governance mechanisms are needed to manage inputs and outcomes, as well as the collaboration 
process, including coordination and adjustment of activities of interdependent parties, it is 
meaningful to look at measures of outcome performance as well as measures indicating the 
performance of the process of cooperation (Ariño, 2003; Kumar and Nti, 1998). This entails that 
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inter-organizational performance is assessed on the basis of rational (economic or strategic) as 
well as cognitive processes of the participants in open innovation projects (De Rond, 2003). 
Outcome performance captures the effectiveness and efficiency of a relationship, including the 
degree of overall performance satisfaction, the extent to which strategic goals are fulfilled, and 
parties‟ adherence to schedules and budgets (see Ariño, 2003; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). 
Process performance, instead, pertains to the relational quality of the collaboration (Ariño, et al., 
2001), entailing ease or efficiency of cooperation (Luo, 2002), the extent to which conflicts 
prevail in the relationship, and partners‟ satisfaction with coordination and communication 
processes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).   
 
The relationship between governance and inter-organizational performance is one where an 
appropriate balance between the elements which are being formalized and which are not being 
formalized needs to be found. On the one hand, the setting of objectives and the negotiation 
process which precede the final contract contributes to a better mutual understanding among the 
parties. It could even lead to increased trust towards the organization of the project because the 
partners have a more clear idea about the expectations and the process of the project. On the other 
hand, formal governance can cause rigidity and leave little room for flexibility and creativity. In 
addition, restrictions on the level of formalization are also placed by the possibility to pre-plan. 
Therefore, too much formalization can create a rigid cooperation and innovation process, while 
too little formalization might generate disorder and lack of clear focus (in terms of outcomes and 
process) (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Luo, 2002). Our expectation is formulated in accordance with the 
argument by Vlaar (2006) that the relationship between formalization and inter-organizational 
performance could be depicted by an inverted U-shape (see Figure 1).  
 
Without an initial level of trust among potential partners, collaboration in the setting of 
innovation would become a very difficult endeavor, because uncertainty would lead to a situation 
where the partners continuously question the motives and competences of their partners. Trust is 
required so as to assure that knowledge and information is shared, and potential conflicts and 
differences are more easily resolved. Despite its advantages, a too high level of trust can also be 
disadvantageous, if it is accompanied by naiveté (Vlaar, 2006). Even under conditions of trust, it 
is impossible to exclude opportunistic behavior completely. Therefore, trust can have a negative 
effect when it takes away the tendency to  guard against opportunistic  behavior and assess the 
behavior of others. Furthermore, too much trust can also refrain partners from thinking in terms 
of chances and opportunities which means that they miss out on occasion of possible profit, etc. 
As too low or  too high levels of trust can have a negative effect on inter-organizational 
performance, it is expected that an intermediate level of trust is most effective in open innovation 
settings (see Figure 1).   
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Figure 1 Inter-organizational performance and formalization; inter-organizational performance and trust (Vlaar, 
2006) 
 
 
Methods 
 
Study population   
The projects range from cooperation among chain partners who try to integrate sustainability-
oriented practices into their business to projects which try to build a network of partners from a 
particular region and establish a new arena for innovative ideas and sustainability-oriented 
cooperation. These public-private partnerships are part of a  sustainability-oriented program, 
where cooperation among universities, (semi-) governmental organisations and private sector 
actors is one of the central aspects. The number of participants per project range from 6 to 50 
organisations. There are 6 projects with 9 or less participating organizations and companies, 3 
projects with 10 to 14 participants, 5 projects with 15 to 19 members, 1 project with 20 to 24 and 
3 projects with 30 participants or more. In most of the projects small entrepreneurs and 
companies are taking part and only a few large companies are participating. As most projects 
include two or three knowledge or research institutes and the number of companies fluctuates, the 
ratio knowledge institutes-entrepreneurs is more or less fifty-fifty in smaller projects and around 
one to twelve in the larger projects. Participants include growers, cattle-farmers, processors, 
producers, cooperatives or other umbrella organisations, retailers, engineering companies, 
knowledge institutes, intermediaries, (management and marketing) consultancies and 
governmental and societal organizations, such as animal welfare organisations. The average 
project budget size is between 900,000 and one million euro. On average, the projects take 3 to 4 
years. At the time of data collection, the projects were recently completed or in an advanced stage 
of completion.  
 
Data collection  
Interviews were conducted with project leaders from 18 innovation projects in the agri-food 
sector, in the period from June to August 2009. The in-depth interviews, comprising 32 open 
questions, were complemented with 33 7-point Likert scale statements in order to enable a more 
systematic analysis of the concepts from our model (see Appendix for an overview of the 
measures used in this study). The function of project leader was chosen for the interviews, 
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because it is this partner who has the best overview of the situation in the project. In those cases 
where we were not able to acquire sufficient information from the project leader, other 
participants were approached to complete the picture.  
 
With the intention to improve the validity of the data collected from the projects, we 
triangulated the information collected through interviews with investigation of initial agreements, 
meeting notes and existing evaluation documents. The two-hours lasting interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. As companies do not prefer to reveal their failures or discomforts in the 
context of inter-firm innovation, we had to assure that the information presented cannot be traced 
back to the particular project.  
 
Data analysis  
In order to answer the „how‟ questions and acquire understanding on complex relational 
processes, we have chosen for the multiple case-studies approach. First of all, non-parametric 
Spearman rank correlations tests have been performed in order to acquire insight into the type of 
relationship between the different variables. Secondly, a comparison test in combination with 
Kruskal Wallis tests were carried out to get insight into the mean scores and standard deviation of 
the different groups, as well as the non-parametric significance of differences among the groups. 
Thirdly, a number of cases are compared on the basis of more in-depth information, including 
quotes from the interviews.  
 
Results 
In the following part first of all the differences in governance mechanisms in the four types of 
networks will be laid our, followed by the differences in performance levels.  
 
Table 3 Comparison tests governance in four types of networks                 mean (standard deviation); † Dunnett‟s T3 sig. 0.05 
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Formalisation 
Results from Table 3 show that internal formalisation is the highest in case of high 
heterogeneity and high uncertainty about the market potential. However, on the scale from 0 to 
13, all of the projects score 7 to 8 points in terms of internal formalisation. This indicates that a 
medium level of formalization is of importance for all types of networks. Legal agreements are 
the highest under low uncertainty and high heterogeneity. This indicates that partners are willing 
to commit formally when uncertainty about market potential is low, especially when there is a 
high diversity of actors so as to assure that they appropriate results from the cooperation. 
However, because of the very limited amount of legal agreements made in the projects in our 
sample, it is not possible to make any reliable statements in this respect.  
 
Trust 
The post-hoc test shows that a significant difference in the level of trust, in terms of the 
proportion of partners with whom previous cooperation has taken place, is to be found between 
the group with low level of innovation uncertainty/low network heterogeneity and the group with 
low level of innovation uncertainty/high network heterogeneity (see table 3). Under conditions of 
low innovation uncertainty, it is network heterogeneity which discriminates between high and 
low levels of trust. Compliance trust does not show any pattern of differences, while results do 
point towards a specific direction in the case of competence trust. The latter is lower in networks 
with a lower level of uncertainty about the market potential of the innovation.   
  
Commitment 
The results in Table 3 indicate that attitudinal and rational commitment are higher in case of 
low uncertainty about the market potential. However, the largest difference in rational 
commitment is between network type 4 (high uncertainty/high network heterogeneity) and the 
remaining networks. This designates that it is the combination of the level of innovation 
uncertainty and network heterogeneity which leads to reduced rational commitment.  
 
Performance 
 
Table 4  Comparison tests performance in four types of networks               mean (standard deviation)
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Table 4 presents a more elaborate overview of the differences in scores on the several 
performance measures among the four types of networks. The overall performance, established 
on the basis of information from semi-structured interviews using five indicators (see Appendix 
I), is highest in networks with a low level of uncertainty about the market potential of the 
innovation. Also performance in terms of expectation to benefit from skills, capabilities or 
knowledge acquired during the project is the highest in networks with low uncertainty. The level 
of satisfaction with the cost/benefit ratio of time and money invested in the project is the lowest 
in the most complex networks, type 4 networks. Also continuation of cooperation with a number 
of partners, as a follow-up to the current project, is most likely when partners have cooperate in a 
setting outside the combination of high uncertainty and high network heterogeneity. Results show 
the same result for quality of the cooperation process. The extent of satisfaction with the 
resources engaged in the cooperation process, the manner in which the project was managed, the 
working relationship among the partners in the project and the partners‟ responsiveness to 
problems or inquiries is the lowest in when cooperation has taken place in conditions of low 
uncertainty and low network heterogeneity.  
  
Governance mechanisms and performance  
In the following section, the governance mechanisms and inter-organizational performance 
will be discussed and analysed on the basis of a number of cases which typify the four different 
types of networks. For type 1 and type 2 network, a comparison is made between a successful and 
less successful project in order to illuminate the differences and the elements which are key to 
attain successful innovation projects. Unfortunately, there are no successful projects in our 
dataset with high level of uncertainty about the market potential of the innovation. Because we 
can learn from mistakes and failures, we will discussed and draw lessons from the less successful 
projects in the case of type 3 and type 4 network. Table 7, in Appendix I, gives a schematic 
overview of the measurement of performance of the 6 projects analysed in more depth, below. 
 
 
Table 5 Trust, commitment and formalisation ; +++  high; ++ medium; + low; - absent
 
   
Type 1 Network – Low uncertainty and low heterogeneity  
In the successful project, mutual knowledge and understanding developed during previous 
cooperation and the continued adaptation to one another led the relationship to develop towards 
more trust, giving more space to informal governance mechanisms. The partners  acknowledged 
each other’s  valuable contribution. The increased contact and communication resulted in 
turning their differences into an advantage. Trust is an important complementary to the 
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agreements made. The combination of formal agreements and high level of compliance and 
competence trust at the start of the project which has been upheld during the entire process of 
cooperation and innovation, combined with a high level of commitment, led to the successful 
outcome of the project. The importance of commitment is stressed by the project leader. It is 
important to work with partners who are not only motivated by financial gains but are also 
passionate about the work to be done, the goals and the success to be achieved. The project 
leader points out that commitment and a smooth transition from one phase to the other was 
safeguarded by involvement, at an early stage of the process, of partners who would be needed in 
the later stages of the process, assuring co-ownership of the project ideas and activities.  
 
The goals in this project are continuous because of the long-term character of the project. The 
goals set for this project, such as isolation of a new gen in fruit, are attained, but they represent a 
few components of the final aim. The partners learned much in terms of presentation and 
communication of advantages of this new product. Furthermore, the establishment of cooperation 
and engagement with new organizations and actors opened the door for new possibilities. In 
terms of the cooperation process, they have enjoyed the cooperation with the main partner, as at 
some point they even started to complement each other in the project activities in an organic 
way. Furthermore, there is satisfaction with the resources engaged in the project and the reactions 
of the partners to questions or problems. Despite the positive experience with the cooperation 
process, the departure of one of the partners due to mutual dissatisfaction, sharpened the attention 
of the project leader towards careful assessment of value of individual contributions.     
 
In the less successful project, no transition from formalisation to more informal governance 
mechanisms was made, because of the low strength of social mechanisms to take over 
governance functions. In absence of previous cooperation, the continuous questioning of each 
other‟s commitment obstructed the development of relationships. As the project leader said: In 
this project there was no doubt about the competencies among the partners, but there was a lot of 
doubt concerning hidden agendas and commitment. There is always one party which initiates the 
idea and starts to search partners who possess the necessary competencies for the project. 
However, there must be a clear gain present, which assures commitment for each of the partners 
involved. Especially at the start of the project, it is important to find out what the strategy of  the 
other partners is, acquainting oneself with the ambitions of the partners and learning what one 
can expect from the other. Therefore, it is important to assure commitment of the upper echelon 
management. Even when you are dealing with a company/organization with a very good track-
record and a high commitment at face value, in reality the commitment can be very low because 
there is no support from the management in the company. Absence of increase in trust n this 
project was due to the low level of alignment of interests and motivations, and the absence of 
clarity of commitment on the level of upper echelon management. Furthermore, a re-organisation 
at the lead company led to a decrease in the energy level of the project activities. In addition, the 
change in the direction of the objectives led to decrease in commitment by some of the partners. 
Due to the enduring commitment of the initiator-entrepreneur, some of the goals were achieved, 
but not as intended.  
 
The goals have been partially achieved. Some of the issues developed have been successful, for 
example the development of sustainability trajectories with suppliers, including quality labels 
and requirements for suppliers. The other goals, such as development of a full sustainability 
strategy for the company and cooperation with a societal organization, has been less successful, 
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as the societal organization involved decreased interest in and prioritization of the project. The 
societal organizations involved reached a limit to their level of commitment at some point, 
because some of the aspects in the project became too intertwined with the internal 
considerations and strategic decisions which complicated the cooperation process.  
Furthermore, most of the research performed and knowledge developed was done upon insistence 
by the knowledge institute and the intermediary organization involved which was not considered 
very useful by the practice-oriented partners. The project leader is very dissatisfied with the 
cooperation process, because it was not sufficiently demand-driven. The intermediary 
organization used the project as a sort of experiment instead of facilitating its progress and 
success. Furthermore, there were some power-struggles and shift in leadership. At the start of the 
project it was the intention that all the parties would contribute to the strategy of the company, 
but in reality the company was the one who determines the course because this is the partner 
which implements and bears the final costs.  
 
Type 2 Network – Low uncertainty and high heterogeneity  
In the successful project, partners were carefully selected and considerable attention was 
given to formalisation of objectives, tasks, etc. Although commitment and growth of trust gave 
room to informal governance, planning and agreements retained an important governance 
function. This was exemplified by the increased attention to formalisation of  terms of access to 
the network. During the concept development and technical implementation phases, adjustments 
to the initial agreements were made, indicating that planning and structuring remained an 
important aspect of governance throughout the entire project. Despite the trust-building activities, 
such as visits to each other‟s organisations, three partners left the project because they were not 
sufficiently convinced of the potential of the innovation goal. Their departure only raised the 
overall level of trust, because only the committed partners remained. The level of commitment 
grew as the direction of the objectives was becoming more clear. The time and effort spent by the 
project leader in the coordination and assurance of progress, contributed to the necessary 
information exchange, mutual understanding and problem-solving.  
 
Overall, the project is considered successful. The entrepreneurs consider the project as successful 
when the new, intended company is physically in place and when it is profitable and self-
sustainable. For the entrepreneurs the highest possible attainment of sustainability-oriented goals 
is not the most important issue, but the return on the financial investments made. The goals set 
for this project, which constitute a fraction of the entire pool of aims, are successfully achieved. 
As the project is in the phase of acquiring the building permit, there is still a way to go before the 
final aims of the entrepreneurs are attained. For the intermediary organization, the complete list 
of the intended sustainability aims matters. They consider the sustainability aims and all the 
positive side-effects as realized, though there is always a discrepancy between the starting picture 
and the final achievements due to the changes and developments which occur during the project. 
All in all, the project is in congruence with the initial goals and ideas of the intermediary partner. 
The partners have learned a lot in terms of collaboration and management of such complex open 
innovation projects. They indicate a high level of satisfaction with the resources engaged, the 
cooperation with the project partners and their reactions to questions or problems. Especially the 
role of the project leader is highly valued, as without its involvement, the project may have had a 
less successful outcome. For example, the project leader played a major role in coordination and 
stimulation of communication, information exchange and task division among the entrepreneurs.  
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In the less successful project, partners were selected on the basis of their expertise or track 
record in the specific field, from the network of the project initiators. Similar backgrounds were 
considered during the selection in order to put people together where dynamics emerges to come 
to something new. All parties were involved from start of the project in order to assure co-
ownership of the project. Presence of commitment was evident because all entrepreneurs were 
looking for new opportunities and willing to undertake something new. The idea screening, 
concept development and business analysis phases were marked by a low level of formal 
agreements. The gross of the agreements were of an informal nature based on trust, friendship or 
social relations. According to the  project leader, formal agreements do not congruence with 
innovation processes, but a lesson learned is that the investment (whether it is in the form of 
money, working hours or knowledge) needs to be clearly defined at the start of cooperation. 
When it was supposed to enter the technical implementation phase, the project stagnated due to 
deterioration in trust and commitment. The project leader said: If you want to attain  communal 
interest,  you have to keep in mind the separate interests of all the parties and remain honouring 
them. The carefully built and developed cohesion on which the partners have been working to 
increase the level of trust, has been destroyed when the stake of one another was not recognized 
any more. That is what has happened in this project. While the project leader indicates that more 
formalisation was not possible and necessary, it might be the case that formalization could have 
influenced the outcome in a positive way.  
 
The fact that research has been done which has brought the innovation to a next level is 
considered as successful in project, but  because the intended goals, implementation and 
execution of the initial design, was never realized, the project is considered as unsuccessful.  The 
project has failed on two aspects. First of all, the organization of the legal and financial aspects 
failed, inhibiting any commercial prospect. More specifically, the failure was made at the 
consortium formation stage because this never turned into an actual success. Secondly, the 
communication and knowledge management constituted a problem. For a good knowledge flow it 
is important to build a network which collaborates, but in this case research was executed in 
separate corners, lacking actual collaboration. Despite all the energy and effort put into 
knowledge creation and development of the concept, the project stagnated because the 
differences among the partners eclipsed the commonalities.  The reason why things did not go as 
planned is mainly due to the inter-cultural differences and perhaps the lack of sufficient 
commercial emphasis. The collaboration process did result in a lot of lessons about the way in 
which this type of projects is ought to be managed. The network, the actors and the right 
entrepreneurs are important because they are the attention seeker for the entire project.  The 
entrepreneurs need the other stakeholders, but they must be the leaders of the project if it is to 
result in success.  
 
Type 3 Network – High uncertainty and low heterogeneity  
In the less successful project, only two parties, which did not cooperate previously, assumed 
an active and committed role in the project. The relationship among the rest of the partners 
stagnated, despite their common participation in a platform where they were able to communicate 
and gain knowledge about one another. This project demonstrates that previous relations do not 
necessarily lead to better results in terms of cooperation. Compliance trust and competence trust 
became very low, because most of the partners did not fulfil their promises and did not exhibit 
the specialized competencies which they were expected to posses and deliver. Only the small 
entrepreneur and one of the knowledge institutes demonstrated a high level of commitment to the 
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project activities. The other partners did not assign priority to the project, because of small gains 
involved for these parties. Their low commitment was reflected by absence of any assistance 
during very difficult and crucial times for the progress of the project. The project demonstrates 
how important calculative, but also affective commitment is for an innovation project. At the start 
of the project very little agreement were made. Only rough aims and plans were agreed upon and 
as the project progressed, the agreements were given with even less attention. The two active 
partners managed the project in an organic way, dealing with circumstances as they came along. 
The low level of formalisation omitted the partners from sufficient negotiation, discussion and 
alignment, at the start of the project, depriving them of assurance of commitment which would 
have induced effort to relationship development and trust building.  
 
The main goal, development of knowledge with regards to growing of a new plant, was achieved 
but with great difficulties. If the necessary adaptations were not made, none of the goals would 
have been achieved. The part of research related to processing, production and commercialization 
possibilities, was less successful. Scaling-up, which was also part of the goals, has gained 
potential, but outside of the current project set-up. It has some feasibility only due to the effort 
put in by the entrepreneur in the project to find new partners willing to take risk in the field of 
scaling-up and commercialization. There is a very low level of satisfaction with the cooperation 
process. The entrepreneur, and at the same time the project leader, feels that the other partners 
have left him in the dark at most difficult times in the process when he needed their help and 
support. For example, the parties did not give any support in the resolution of the conflict with 
the stakeholders who objected the execution of the experiment at the location selected. The 
project leader is especially not amused about the fact that at the point when he arranged 
everything and things started to turn to more success, the other partners started to show their 
involvement again.  
 
Type 4 Network – High uncertainty and high heterogeneity  
In this less successful project, where the integral community approach was supposed to have 
a central role, path-dependency obstructed the progress because the partners could not leave the 
established roles. Previous cooperation between governmental agencies, societal organizations 
and entrepreneurs, as well as between the countryside and urban areas, was limited. The 
established ways of informal communication, hierarchy and power-balances impeded the 
development of competence trust in the unconventional roles and tasks the partners were 
supposed to assume. The rhetorical question by the project leader  how to force people to comply 
to the agreements made, indicates that the level of compliance trust was also low in this project. 
The idea generation and screening phases in this project, which included a lot of brainstorming 
and compiling of ideas for practical projects between unconventional partners, did not allow for 
financial commitment at the start. However, the problem is that even after three years of the 
project, actual commitment in terms of financial investment by the entrepreneurs remained very 
limited. Furthermore, the financial problems of one of the main partners and the change in project 
leadership did not contribute to continuance and coherence in project activities. The project did 
not result in success, despite the increase in specificity of agreements, with more tangible 
objectives and increased clarity for practice-oriented partners. The main reason for little success 
was the low level of trust and commitment.  
 
A number of small innovative initiatives have been started in the region, as was intended, and 
the outlook of the entrepreneurs has changed to some extent. However, these are minor steps in 
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progress when compared to the initial aims set for this project. Due to uncontrollable occurrences, 
such as the financial problems of one the main partners, changes in the project leadership and 
commitment in terms of confidence that a new concept of unconventional alliance would work, 
the project became limitedly successful. The main problem is related to the lack of commitment 
by partners to make the necessary financial investments. Because there is no actual execution and 
implementation of the plans, the project is not considered as very successful.  There are quite 
some possibilities, according to the project leader, but the set-up of the project is too big and it 
was not based on the initiative of an entrepreneur, but mainly on the initiative of the regional 
government in cooperation with knowledge institutes. It required a lot of effort to keep the project 
alive in these conditions of low commitment and high level of distrust among the partners to 
collaborate in new settings with changed roles. As a consequence, there is a low level of 
satisfaction with the cooperation process.   
 
Conclusions 
Overall performance is the highest in projects with low innovation uncertainty, which is not 
surprising considering the fact that there is a greater tendency of failure in highly complex and 
uncertain innovation trajectories. In conditions of high uncertainty and high network 
heterogeneity, the cooperation becomes even more complicated as shown by the lowest scores in 
terms of the cost/benefit ratio of time and money spent on the project and quality of the 
cooperation process. The unsuccessful high heterogeneity networks, Type 2 and Type 4, show 
that the socio-cultural differences among the different project partners have inhibited partially the 
innovation process. The most commonly mentioned reason for lower performing projects is the 
lack of commitment by one of the partners, either to realize the sustainability-oriented goals or to 
assure the necessary financial investment. Also lack of project leadership by a (capital-intensive) 
entrepreneur is mentioned as reason for lower performance. It is remarkable that most of the 
lower performing projects mention the absence of implementation and  commercialization as the 
main indicator of lower performance, while the partners in the higher performing projects accept 
the fact that they did not reach their final aim. The latter made a much more realistic picture 
concerning their expectations at the start of the project, which did not result in disappointment 
due to miscalculations. This indicates that deliberation, in the form of formalization, at the start 
of the project is useful to set straight the expectations and acquire insight into the actual 
possibilities, in conditions of heterogeneity. The result that performance, in terms of acquiring 
useful skills and knowledge from collaboration, is the highest in networks with low innovation 
uncertainty is surprising as it would be expected that partners learn most from highly uncertain 
innovation trajectories. However, the case-study analysis shows that most of the respondents 
indicate that they have learned something from the entire process, even the lower performing 
ones. The difference between the higher and lower performing projects is related to the reason 
that they mention as ground for drawing these lessons. Partners from higher performing projects 
refer to positive, unexpected gains, such as new contacts which opened the door for new 
possibilities. Partners from the lower performing projects mention only their dissatisfactions with 
the collaboration process and the way these have taught them how not to do things.   
 
The expectation, as set out in Table 2, that internal formalization is important for each type of 
network is reflected by the results which show a medium level of internal formalization in all 
types of networks. However, the expectation that legal formalization is less important for Type 3 
network, see Table 2, could not be rejected or supported because of the generally low level of 
legal formalization in the projects under study. The case-study analysis shows that in networks 
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with a low level of innovation uncertainty, formalization is somewhat higher in the higher 
performing projects. This observation indicates a tendency of a positive relationship between a 
medium to high level of formalization and inter-organizational performance. Results from this 
research are in congruence with the expectation that a too low level of formal governance is not 
beneficial for the inter-organizational cooperation (Vlaar, 2006). However, as there are no cases 
of extreme levels of formalization in the present set of projects, it is difficult to conclude that too 
much formalization is harmful to the innovation process. As the dataset does not include high 
performing projects in conditions of high uncertainty, it is not possible to conclude that partners 
are more inclined to formalize the innovation process in low uncertainty because a higher level of 
confidence about the potential success of the project. Furthermore, the case-studies show a 
slightly higher effort toward formalization in the more heterogeneous networks, while in the 
more homogeneous networks, slightly more emphasis is put on the organic approach of 
cooperation. All in all, when all partners are involved in the process of formalization at the start 
of the project, conflicts and misunderstandings are avoided later on in the project. Through 
deliberation and negotiation, a lot of information on the interests and expectations is exchanged, 
enabling the parties to detect presence or absence of actual commitment to the project. This 
creates stability of the network, reducing the amount of time and effort needed to search and 
select new partners, in case of attrition of participants.  
 
According to theoretical expectations, rational commitment should be especially important in 
high uncertainty networks (see Table 2). The fear of foregoing the benefits and profits from the 
innovation should function as an incentive for partners to abstain from opportunistic behaviour, 
as the latter could lead to expulsion from the project. In contrast, the comparison tests and the 
case studies show that commitment is higher in successful, lower innovation uncertainty projects. 
The lowest rational commitment in high uncertainty/high heterogeneity networks testifies that 
highly risky and complex projects lead to lower reluctance to commit to the innovation projects. 
While it was expected that attitudinal commitment is higher in low network heterogeneity (see 
Table 2), the results show that attitudinal commitment is the highest in case of low innovation 
uncertainty which indicates that heterogeneity and attitudinal commitment are not related. A 
possible explanation for this is that attachment of value to cooperation is related to performance 
of the project. In the higher performing project with low and high heterogeneity, commitment 
was high or increasing, while in the lower performing, high and low heterogeneity projects, 
commitment was questioned, absent or destroyed over time. In low and high heterogeneity 
networks, positive development of relationships is necessary to allow trust and commitment to 
increase. Commitment to a relationship grows when all partners experience a growing amount of 
benefits from the cooperation.  
 
Theoretical expectation was that competence trust would be especially important in the highly 
heterogeneous networks and that competence and compliance trust would be high in low 
heterogeneity networks (see Table 2). Results show that previous cooperation is the highest in 
projects with low level of uncertainty and low network heterogeneity. Case study analysis shows 
the highest level of compliance trust in the successful, more homogenous network, as previous 
cooperation has increased the knowledge about partners‟ reliability in terms of compliance with 
promises and agreements made. It is surprising that partners who have cooperated previously do 
not engage in more uncertain innovation trajectories. The fact that previous cooperation is more 
frequent in the lower heterogeneity projects is in line with expectations. The fact that results 
show that competence trust is generally lower in conditions of high innovation uncertainty may 
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be related to the fact that the partners do not know exactly which competencies they will need in 
the future to attain the aims of the project. Case-study analysis shows that despite trust-building 
activities in the heterogeneous network, the level of competence trust was the highest in the more 
homogenous network where the partners started to complement each other in the project 
activities in an organic way. The lower performing, low and high heterogeneity projects do not 
show any remarkable difference in the level of trust. The trust-building in the high heterogeneity, 
less successful project was destroyed by the loss of respect for the interests, position and point of 
view of one another. In the lower heterogeneity network, increase in trust remained absent 
because of continued suspicion about hidden agendas and commitment of certain partners.  
Previous cooperation and inter-organizational performance are not necessarily related. Overall 
performance and expected benefits from skills and knowledge gained from cooperation show the 
same pattern of scores as competence trust. This directs to the conclusion that a relationship 
exists between competence trust and outcome-related inter-organizational performance.  
Compliance trust and performance indicators related to the cooperation process show similar 
pattern in scores which points towards a relationship between compliance trust and inter-
organizational performance in terms of the quality of the cooperation process.  
 
 
 18 
Appendix I
Concept Operational definition 
Network heterogeneity 
 
Types of organizations classified according to categories of International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) list, where 
the economic activities are subdivided in a hierarchical, four-level structure of mutually exclusive categories. The number of 
different types of organizations used as measure of heterogeneity. (Monge, et al., 1998) 
Innovation Uncertainty  
(Market potential) 
7-points Likert scale 
Certainty is high that there will be a market for the outcome/innovation of the project. . (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Sapienza 
and Gupta, 1994; Zaltman, Duncan and Holbeck, 1973) 
Rational commitment 
7-points Likert scale  
Semi-structured questions 
Willing to make additional investments in the project, if needed. (Cullen et al., 2000) 
General commitment in the project established using indicators such as time investment in the project by individual partners, 
support from management, origin ideas from entrepreneurs, from researchers (governmental or societal organizations) or 
common ownership of the project aims; time and effort put in the coordination by the project leader.  
Attitudinal commitment 
7-points Likert scale  
Average presented in Table 6 
We would drop the current partners if we would come across parties with better project ideas. There is a strong sense of 
loyalty among the partners.  Continuation of cooperation with the current partners is more or less self-evident.  (Ring and Van 
de Ven 1992; Muthusamy and White, 2005) 
Formalization  
Internal 
 
Legal  
inventory of agreements 
aims, task division, time planning, organizational structure (such as foundation of a steering committee), decision-making 
rights and progress assessment criteria (see Table 1) 
Investment of resources, extension clauses, punitive sanctions on non-compliance, conflict resolution, procedures for 
termination of the cooperation and criteria for entrance of new members, (intellectual) property rights and confidentiality 
agreements (see Table 2) (Gulati, 2007; Omta and Van Rossum, 1999; Parkhe, 1993; Vlaar, Bosch and Van den Volberda, 
2007; Sobrero and Schrader, 1998) 
Trust 
Previous cooperation  
Indication per partners whether previous cooperation in any kind of project has taken place. (Heide and John, 1992; Klein 
Woolthuis, 1999; Claro, 2004) 
Compliance Trust 
7-points Likert scale 
The three key partners always fulfill their promises.  
Competence Trust 
7-points Likert scale 
Semi-structured interviews 
The key partners have specialized capabilities that add value to the project.  
 
Trust on the project level established on the basis of examples provided by the project leader and explanations about the 
development of trust over time. (Golden and Powell, 2000; Claro, 2004; Heide and John, 1992; Cullen et al., 2000) 
Inter-org. performance 
7 point Likert scale  
 
Overall performance 
established on the basis of  
Information from semi-
structured interviews 
 
Quality cooperation process 
 
Average presented in Table 6 
We expect to benefit from skills, capabilities or knowledge acquired during the project to a great extent. The cost/benefit ratio 
of time and money invested in the project is satisfactory. Continuation of cooperation with a number of partners will follow-up 
this project. (Kumar et al., 1995; Zollo et al., 2002; Kogut 1991; Straub et al., 2004)  
The performance on the following five categories has been rated per project, resulting in a score of  performance from 1 to 7: 
extent (amount and degree) of research and practice-oriented (initial/adapted) aims achieved; follow-up projects or actions; 
interest from external parties for the results of the project; satisfaction with the cooperation process; change towards more 
openness and long-term collaboration (Ariño, 2003; Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Hollander, 2002; Omta and van 
Rossum, 1999).   
Extent of satisfaction with the resources engaged in the cooperation process; the manner in which the project was managed; 
the working relationship among the partners in the project; partners‟ responsiveness to problems or inquiries (Ariño, 2003; 
Luo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) 
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Appendix II 
 
 
 
Table 7   Performance per project included in the case-study analysis, established on the basis of the five categories of “overall performance” (see Appendix I)  
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